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Abstract 
We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. 
Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis 
makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same 
vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. 
Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that 
their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when 
they determine the voting outcome. 
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1. Introduction 
Charitable giving in the United States accounted for over $373 billion in 2015, 
which was 2.1% of the gross domestic product.1 The extent of donations once puzzled 
economists because generous behaviour was difficult to reconcile with traditional models 
based on rational selfish behaviour. Hochman and Rogers (1969) and Kolm (1969) 
addressed this puzzle by considering that charitable giving created a public good. Once 
the public benefit from charity becomes an argument in individual preferences, the act of 
giving may be purely rational. 
 
A large body of the literature on charitable giving has focused on individual donors, who 
select the amount of their endowment to contribute to a public good on their own.2 This 
individual approach to charitable giving is applicable in 3 out of 4 charitable gifts in the 
States, as individuals account for 75% of all charitable giving. However, the remaining 
25% ($90 billion) comes from organizations and foundations, among others. In this paper 
we try to explore how different decision rules within groups or teams of individuals may 
influence the final donation. 
 
The small amount of experimental literature on team dictator games highlights the 
intricacies of the interaction within groups. Cason and Mui (1997) find that groups give 
more than individuals while Luhan et al (2009) find the reverse in a fairly unstructured 
decision process (face to face communication and a chat mechanism, respectively). In 
this paper we study how the heterogeneity of the members’ social preferences interact 
within a structured voting process when a variety of decision rules are considered. 
 
In a standard team dictator game n players decide how much of the group endowment nw 
to contribute to a public good, keeping an equal share of the rest. We reframe this setting 
to ask groups of n individuals, each endowed with w, to decide on a common contribution 
to a public good. In a sense, our framing is similar to the one used in the political economy 
literature of taxation, as in Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) in which the median voter 
determines the tax rate.3  
 
In this paper we consider a variety of social choice mechanisms where group members 
vote on the common amount they all have to donate, including the extreme case in which 
the donation is picked randomly (the super dictatorial, see below). Our rules span from 
one favouring selfish participants (the mechanism MIN picks the smallest vote), to one 
favouring more altruistic individuals (the mechanism MAX selects the largest vote in the 
																																								 																				
1 Data on charity giving are taken from Giving USA 2016 report. 
2 Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) are precursors of this approach. The provision of a public good through 
voluntary contributions may generate utility by a joy-of-giving, independent of any concern for the interest 
of others. In these models, for example Bergstrom et al (1986) and Andreoni (1989, 1990), the motivations 
underlying individual voluntary donations typically combine pure altruism (linked to the recipients’ well-
being) and warm-glow (or impure altruism, associated to the joy of donating). 
3 Provided that tax evasion is not allowed. Voting over taxes when tax evasion is a possibility has been 
recently considered by Traxler (2009) 
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group). An intermediate rule is the mechanism AVG, in which the donation assigned by 
the mechanism is the average vote.4  
 
One interesting characteristic of all these mechanisms we analyse is that a standard 
Bayesian5 analysis shows that they are vote-equivalent: the MIN and MAX mechanisms 
are dominance solvable and the dominant strategy is the donation they would choose in 
the super dictatorial mechanism. We find that vote-equivalency is consistently violated 
in two different lab experiments: votes in MIN mechanisms are smaller than those in the 
AVG mechanism, which in fact are smaller than the votes in the MAX mechanism. In 
addition, votes do not depend on the size of the group. 
 
One possible explanation for the violation of the equivalence result comes from a 
common feature of the MAX and MIN mechanisms: a single player determines collective 
decisions. In other words, both mechanisms generate single winners. A joy-of-winning, 
defined as the extra utility that a player gets from winning the auction or contest, has been 
shown to explain overbidding in first price auctions (Cooper et al, 2008) and 
overinvestment in contest games (Dechenaux et al, 2012). In a similar way, we define joy 
of ruling as the extra utility that a group member gets from winning the competition to 
rule. Any extra utility from becoming the ruler immediately implies that votes in the MIN 
and MAX mechanisms will differ because members, rather than choosing their 
dominating voting strategy, will choose lower (higher) votes in the MIN (MAX) 
mechanism to rule and gain the extra utility. 
 
The rationale for this joy of ruling is not far from recent work on the intrinsic value of 
decision rights. In this branch of the literature, subjects are willing to pay non-negligible 
amounts of money, beyond its instrumental benefits, to rule over others (Fehr et al, 2013 
and Bartling et al, 2014), and to avoid being controlled by other subjects (as in the control 
premium found by Owens et al, 2014). The suboptimal levels of delegation (as in Coats 
and Rankin, 2016, or Bobadilla et al, 2016) may be related to a willingness to retain 
(illusory) control on outcomes (as in Sloof and Siemens, 2014).  
 
In our experiments, we elicit the joy of ruling by auctioning the right to impose the super 
dictatorial donation of a subject on all participants in the session. In addition, we elicit 
																																								 																				
4 These mechanisms resemble some production functions in team production settings that date back to 
Hirshleifer (1983): the weakest link mechanism, where the team output is given by the minimum effort, the 
best shot mechanism, where the team output is determined by the largest effort, and the linear mechanism 
in which the team output is the average effort. For a comprehensive experimental analysis of the 
performance of these production functions in team production settings see Croson et al (2015). They find 
that contributions in the weakest-link are smaller than in the linear and the best shot mechanism. Despite 
similar qualitative results, there are notable differences between the team production setting and our 
collective decision mechanism: in the former, “votes” are costly –meaning that group members individually 
bear the cost of their own effort- and therefore team members obtain different levels of material payoffs 
whereas in our setting, all players get the same material payoff, e.g. the same combination of private-public 
good provision but enjoy different utility levels because of the existence of heterogeneous preferences over 
the provision of the public good. 
5 In a Bayesian framework, each player is characterized by a type –defined by their social preferences - and 
the beliefs held about the types of other players.  
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subjects’ types -i.e. their donation in a standard dictator game- and carefully control for 
their beliefs on other subjects’ types. Our measure of joy of ruling (subjects’ bids) 
significantly predicts the probability that a participant will cast different votes in the MIN 
and MAX mechanisms. A structural model controlling for the endogeneity of beliefs (in 
which beliefs are assumed to depend on type) shows that joy of ruling is particularly 
strong in the MAX mechanism. Beliefs increase with type in all mechanisms, confirming 
the false consensus effect observed in other studies of group behaviour (as in Gächter et 
al, 2012). Interestingly, the super-dictatorial mechanism shows that we should be careful 
when designing collective giving institutions. Altruistic individuals feel responsible for 
others (as documented by Charness and Jackson, 2009) and tend to act as benevolent 
dictators, driving down their dictatorial decisions to concur with the decisions made by 
others.  
 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical analysis. Sections 3 
and 4 describe the experimental design and discuss the experimental results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Theory of Collective Giving 
Consider a group of 𝑛 individuals deciding on the amount of a public good to produce. 
Each group member has an endowment 𝑤 and there is a technology that converts the 
private good into the public good. In Bergstrom et al (1986)’s standard Voluntary 
Provision Paradigm, each member decides independently which amount of their 
endowment to devote to the public good. Each member is characterized by a utility 
function whose arguments are their consumption of the private good 𝑥$ and the total 
amount of the public good 𝐺 = 𝑔()(*+ .6 
 
In this paper we focus on provision decisions made at the group level, rather than by the 
independent decisions of the members. There are many ways to aggregate individual 
preferences into a social preference for the public good. Consider a family of mechanisms 
in which each member sends unilaterally a message 𝜃 about their type 𝜃 and the 
mechanism assigns, given the message profile 𝜃+, … , 𝜃)  the same contribution level for 
all members. A natural way of conceiving the type of a player is to think of it as the 
amount of the endowment that they would contribute to the public good if they decided 
on their gift voluntarily and independently (e.g. under the Voluntary Provision 
Paradigm). A type 𝜃 = 0 would correspond to a selfish player and a type 𝜃 = 𝑤 would 
correspond to a fully altruistic player.   
 
																																								 																				
6 Andreoni (1989, 1990) extends the framework by assuming that the gift to the public good also enters in 
the utility function. None of the conclusions we arrive at in this paper depends on the existence of this 
warm-glow associated to giving. To keep things simple, we stick to the standard analysis in Bergstrom et 
al (1986). 
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An example of a mechanism within this family consists of randomly picking one element 
of the message profile. For this super dictatorial mechanism, each player will find optimal 
to send the message 𝑔$01 which solves the following super dictatorial decision problem:7 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 45 𝑈$ 𝑥$, 𝐺𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑥$ + 𝑔$ = 𝑤𝐺 = 𝑛𝑔$0 ≤ 𝑔$ ≤ 𝑤  (1) 
 
The “super dictatorial” contribution level 𝑔$01 is related to the Reciprocity Principle in 
Sugden (1984), which would explain positive contributions to public goods. Accordingly, 
if a player could choose a single level of contribution for all the group members, this is 
the level the player would choose. Other examples of mechanisms within this family are 
those that select (i) the smallest message -MIN Mechanism-, (ii) the largest message -
MAX mechanism- and (iii) the mean message -AVG mechanism-.  
 
The implementation of different mechanisms opens the door to different research 
questions. In this paper we do not analyse the process by which a group agrees to use a 
particular aggregating mechanism, as mechanisms are exogenously imposed. We do not 
study the participation constraint either (e.g. whether some members will abstain from 
participating in the group mechanism). Although these questions are interesting and 
deserve future attention, we focus on analysing the incentives that the different 
mechanisms give to the group members to strategically manipulate the mechanism in their 
favour. 
 
Beyond the exploration of different statistics determining the group donation, these 
mechanisms have interesting features. While in the AVG mechanism, the common 
contribution level is jointly determined by all group members, in the MIN and MAX 
mechanisms, the common contribution is decided by a single player. Moreover, intuition 
suggests that the MIN mechanism favours selfish types while altruistic types would be 
favoured in the MAX mechanism as they may impose their preferred donation on the rest 
of the group. A more rigorous analysis of the games defined by the mechanisms reveals 
a surprise that violates this intuition. In the Bayesian games defined by the MAX and the 
MIN mechanisms, reporting the super dictatorial type 𝑔01 is a weakly dominant strategy. 
This is the content of Theorem 1. 
 
Theorem 1. In the Bayesian games defined by the MAX and MIN mechanisms, the super 
dictatorial decision 𝑔01 is a (weakly) dominant strategy. 
Proof. See Appendix A 
																																								 																				
7 Note that for the super dictatorial mechanism, there is no strategic interaction among players, because the 
procedure by which a message is chosen is independent from the messages that others send to the 
mechanism. This is why the optimal message is the solution to the unipersonal decision problem in (1). The 
super dictatorial decision 𝑔$01 exists as long as the utility function complies with the standard quasi-
concavity assumption. 
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The intuition behind Theorem 1 is straightforward. The highest utility a player can get in 
a setting where all group members end up contributing the same amount to the public 
good is by definition the utility level attached to their super dictatorial donation level. By 
selecting their super dictatorial donation in the MAX and MIN mechanisms a player still 
stands a chance of achieving their highest utility if the mechanism selects it. If not selected 
because it is not the highest (smallest) message, then any alternative message would be 
either neutral –if it does not affect the mechanism choice- or detrimental to her if it affects 
it –because that would imply pushing further in the wrong direction, e.g. selecting a too 
high (low) message. 
 
The relationship between the super dictatorial decision 𝑔01 and the player’s true type 𝜃$ 
reveals an interesting issue. The constraints in (1) can be collapsed into the following 
budget constraint: 𝑥$ + +) 𝐺 = 𝑤, where the “price” of the public good 𝐺 is the inverse of 
the group size 𝑛. Hence, only if player 𝑖 thinks of the private and the public as independent 
goods, the super dictatorial contribution 𝑔$01 will coincide with player 𝑖’s type, both MAX 
and MIN mechanisms become incentive compatible and the truthful revelation of a 
player’s type is a dominant strategy.8 
 
Lemma 1. Truthful revelation of types is a dominant strategy in the MAX and the MIN 
mechanisms if the private and public goods are independent 
 
We next describe some properties of the AVG mechanism –although a complete Bayesian 
analysis of the AVG mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. While the AVG 
mechanism is not dominance solvable, it holds some resemblance to the standard 
voluntary provision paradigm analysed in Bergstrom et al (1986). Assume that players’ 
types are common knowledge and focus on the Nash equilibrium 𝑔+∗, … , 𝑔>∗  of the AVG 
mechanism. The maximization problem that governs player i’s optimal response can be 
rewritten as follows 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 ?5,@ 𝑈$ 𝑥$, 𝐺𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑥$ + 1𝑛 𝐺 = 𝑤𝐺 ≥ 𝐺C$  (2) 
 
This formulation has two differences with respect to the Voluntary Contribution 
Paradigm. First, the individual is not endowed with the “social income” 𝑤 + 𝐺C$ but with 
his own income	𝑤. Second, the price of the public good is again the inverse of the 
																																								 																				
8 Player 𝑖 will under-report (over-report) their type if the private and the public goods are complementary 
(substitute). 
[7] 
 
population size, and therefore group size affects player i’s decision depending on whether 
the private and the public goods are independent or not.9  
 
Finally, for any symmetric profile of types the three mechanisms share the same 
equilibrium (compare (2) to (1) and note that the restriction 𝐺 ≥ 𝐺C$ in (2) is not binding 
by symmetry). As an example, consider the case of 𝑛 identical members with Cobb-
Douglas utility functions (note that for a Cobb-Douglas function, the cross-price elasticity 
is zero and Lemma 1 applies).  
 
Coob-Douglas Case. Suppose a group of n individuals with identical preferences 𝑢$ 𝑥$, 𝐺 =𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑥$ + 1 − 𝛼 𝑙𝑛𝐺 in the AVG mechanism. Let 𝜃$  denote the message that player i sends. Let 
the Nash equilibrium of the mechanism be 𝜃+∗, … , 𝜃)∗ . The equilibrium message of player i is the 
solution to the following maximization problem (we intentionally restrict the example to equality 
constraints) 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃𝑖 	𝛼𝑙𝑛 𝑤 − 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃(∗(I$𝑛 + 1 − 𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃(∗(I$  
 
The first order condition is CJ)KC L5M LN∗NO5 + +CJL5M LN∗NO5 = 0. Solving for 𝜃$ we obtain the optimal 
response of player i 𝜃$ = 𝑛 1 − 𝛼 𝑤 − 𝜃(∗(I$ .For the symmetric equilibrium, 𝜃$∗ = 𝜃(∗ = 𝜃∗ for , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, we get the equilibrium message 𝜃∗ = 1 − 𝛼 𝑤, which is precisely the true 
type, e.g. the amount that a Cobb-Douglas player would donate in a public good game. Hence, 
the (Nash) equilibrium is independent of the group size n and equal to the dominant strategy in 
the MAX and the MIN mechanisms. 
 
Now that we have analysed the different mechanism from a theoretical angle, we describe 
in detail the laboratory experiments we used to investigate collective giving under the 
three mechanisms. Because the equivalence among the three mechanisms in terms of the 
equilibrium structure only hold for a symmetric profile of preferences (e.g. types) and we 
know from lab experiments that experimental subjects’ heterogeneity is the norm, in our 
empirical exercise we will be mostly concerned with the equivalence between the MAX 
and the MIN mechanisms (which is actually based on dominance arguments –a weaker 
notion than equilibrium-, and refer to it as the Equivalence Theorem. However, we will 
also include in our exercise the analysis of the behaviour AVG mechanism to check 
whether the more demanding version of the equivalence is observed in the lab. 
 
 
3. A double experimental test 
In the previous section, we have used standard terminology from the literature in Bayesian 
mechanisms. In the experimental implementation we did not ask subjects to send 
messages about their type (e.g. to report their types) but to cast votes. In the remainder of 
																																								 																				
9 This is in sharp contrast to the results in the voluntary provision game. As the group grows in size, the 
equilibrium gift tends to zero under pure altruism, whereas zero convergence is not obtained under pure 
warm glow (and no altruism, see Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). 
[8] 
 
the paper, we will refer to voting behaviour and votes in the different mechanisms rather 
than type reporting and reported type or messages. Only when referring to subjects’ 
donations in a Standard dictator game will we refer to their decisions as the subject’s type. 
We will come back to this notation issue later. 
 
3.1. Experimental Design 
In our first experiment, Experiment I, we test the Equivalence Theorem using a 3x3 
factorial design: three group sizes (1, 3 and 10) and three mechanisms (AVG, MIN and 
MAX). Table 1 provides a summary of the design, including the order in which the three 
mechanisms were played. This design allows a within-subject test of the Equivalence 
Theorem (as all subjects went through the three mechanisms in three stages) and a 
between-subject analysis of any group size effect (as group size was never altered across 
the three stages of the game). Groups of size 1 serve as a control treatment. 
 
Table 1. Experimental design - Experiment I 
  
 
Mechanism 
Group size 
Stage 
Dictator 
N=1 
Small 
N=3 
Large 
N=10 
1 AVG AVG-1 AVG-3 AVG-10 
 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
2 MIN MIN-1 MIN-3 MIN-10 
 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
3 MAX MAX-1 MAX-3 MAX-10 
 
Participants in Experiment I were informed of the order in which the mechanisms were 
to be played. They were also told that they were to be allocated to groups of variable size 
(with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 10).10 Participants made a single decision per 
stage without feedback, so their decisions are independent. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were informed about their payoffs and group decisions. The group size was 
kept fixed for every subject across periods to allow for a within subjects analysis.11 As 
the group size was announced at the beginning of each stage, subjects were not aware of 
their group size in subsequent stages when making a decision in a given stage. 
 
The experiment was run in a standard and fully anonymous and private environment, and 
all participants faced the three mechanisms in the same order: AVG, MIN and MAX.12 
Even when order effects cannot be fully ruled out, we are quite confident that two 
voluntary omissions helped to alleviate the concern: subjects received no feedback at the 
end of each stage and the lack of any emphasis on the particular sequence chosen (see the 
																																								 																				
10 As the number of subjects attending every session was not a round number, the perception that subjects 
were participating in different group sizes was toughened, and credible. 
11 Participants only knew their group size when entering the first stage. Subjects were also informed that 
different group sizes were predefined from a natural base (n=1) to an arbitrary and reasonable ceiling 
(n=10). 
12 This implies that dictators (n=1) made three decisions under three equivalent rules. The reason for that 
was to get a baseline to compare. 
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instructions for details). We also asked subjects to predict the outcome of each mechanism 
without the inclusion of their own reported type.13 
 
The experiment was framed as a real donation decision, as a real charity would benefit 
from the group decision generated by a voting mechanism (see the instructions for 
details). For each mechanism, subjects were individually endowed with 10€, and their 
vote referred to how many Euros, out of their endowment, they voted to allocate to the 
recipient. Hence, in the overall experiment, each subject was endowed with 30€. Three 
additional Euros were awarded for every correct prediction.14 
 
 
3.2 Experimental procedures 
The computerized experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory LINEEX in 
2007, using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Experiments lasted for around 60 
minutes and the average payoff was 24.71€. Participants were undergraduate students, 
mainly enrolled in different Business and Economics degrees at the University of 
Valencia, and had no previous experience in distribution or bargaining games. The total 
number of subjects was 96, distributed in 14 groups of size 1, 14 groups of size 3 and 4 
groups of size 10. For every mechanism, we have 14 independent observations (votes) 
when the group size is 1, 42 when the group size is 3 and 40 when the group size is 10.15 
Instructions were read aloud before the experiment began. After the instructions were 
read and before the game started, subjects completed a simple questionnaire to assure 
they had understood the simple logic of the game.16 
 
The game was conducted using the double blind procedure as in Hoffman et al. (1994), 
in which neither the experimenter nor anyone else except the individual could have known 
the individual decisions. We replaced the collective anonymity of the recipient by a 
reputable Spanish charity,17 following Eckel and Grossman (1996). This provides 
variance in the voting behaviour that would help us have an extensive dataset. At the end 
of the experiment, subjects were informed about group outcomes, the predictive success 
of their predictions, and their earnings. Donations were made in real time using a video 
projector and the NGO webpage. Each participant received their individual earnings in a 
sealed envelope with a computer code while seated in their fully private, individual 
cubicles.  
																																								 																				
13 They had to predict the average reported type of the other participants in their group in the AVG 
mechanism, the smallest reported type of the other participants in their group in the MIN mechanism and 
the largest reported type of the other participants in their group in the MAX mechanism.  
14 Note that this prediction exercise is insubstantial for n=1. They were however requested to predict their 
own vote to make procedures and payoffs homogeneous. 
15 Recall that no information feedback was provided until the end of the experiment; as was explained in 
the previous subsection. 
16 A translated version of the questionnaire is also available upon request from the authors. 91 out of 96 
subjects passed the quiz on the first attempt. The remaining five did it in the second attempt with no 
additional explanations. 
17 SOS Ayuda en Acción is a Spanish charity that takes care of homeless children all over the world. It goes 
without saying that subjects did not know about the individual identity of the recipients. 
[10] 
 
3.3 Experimental results 
Table 2 below displays the mean vote across mechanisms and group sizes. For the dictator 
game (group size=1), Wilcoxon signed ranked tests at the individual level show, not 
surprisingly, that there are no significant differences across the three mechanisms 
(p=0.8655 for the difference between AVG and MIN, p=0.7925 for the comparison 
between AVG and MAX and p=0.8124 for the difference between MIN and MAX), with 
an average vote of 16% of the endowment.18 
  
Table 2. Mean vote in Experiment I 
Mechanism 
Dictator 
Game 
Groups 
Small Large  Merged Sample 
AVG 1.57 1.95 2.15 2.05 
↓   (2.27) (2.44) (2.83) (2.63) 
MIN 1.64 1.29 1.70 1.49 
↓ (2.37) (1.77) (2.54) (2.17) 
MAX 1.64 2.98 2.85 2.91 
 (2.23) (3.38) (2.83) (3.11) 
Number of independent observations 42 126 120 246 
(Std. Dev. in brackets) 
 
The natural test of the Equivalence Theorem is the comparison of (mean) votes across the 
MIN and the MAX mechanisms for a given group size larger than 1. The same non-
parametric test (Wilcoxon signed rank) shows that the vote is significantly lower in MIN 
than in MAX (p=0.0051 for the small group of three and p=0.0002 for the large group of 
ten members). This comparison generates our first result: 
 
Result 1. The Equivalence Theorem does not hold. For every group size, votes are 
significantly larger in the MAX mechanism than in the MIN mechanism 
 
Beyond the comparison of means, the distribution of votes is ordered in the sequence 
MIN-AVG-MAX for each group size. The left panel in Figure 1 shows that for small 
groups, the distribution of votes in MAX first-order stochastically dominates the 
distribution in AVG, which in turn dominates the distribution in the MIN mechanism. For 
large groups of ten participants, a similar picture emerges except for very high votes (7 
and above). 
 
A quite different result emerges when analysing the interaction between voting behaviour 
and group size, for each mechanism. Mann-Whitney tests at the individual level show 
that for every mechanism, votes are not significantly different across group sizes 
(p=0.8725, 0.7929 and 0.8500 for AVG, MIN and MAX respectively). This result is 
consistent with Chavanne et al (2011), when reporting similar donation levels in dictator 
games with rebates for different group sizes. The result would also be consistent with the 
theoretical framework introduced in section 2 if participants perceived private and public 
																																								 																				
18 Our charity effect is not as strong as observed by Eckel and Grossman (1996), whose percentage of 
donations went up to 30%, although it is slightly larger than that observed by Hoffman et al (1994) which 
maintained the recipient’s anonymity (9%). 
[11] 
 
goods as independent. The right panel of Figure 1 strongly confirms this result comparing 
vote distributions across group sizes. The analysis of these interactions produces Result 
2: 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of votes in Experiment I 
By Group size By Mechanism 
  
  
  
 
 
 
Result 2. No significant differences between group sizes are observed in voting behaviour 
for the investigated mechanisms, consistent with private and public goods being 
independent. 
 
Pooling the experimental data for groups of size 3 and 10 (as displayed in the last column 
in Table 2), is useful to summarize the main findings from Experiment I: the mean vote 
40
40
6
60
8
80
1 0
10
0
0
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Votes
Votes
Average
Average
Minimum
Minimum
axi u
Maximum
Cumulative distribution
Cumulative distribution
Ind viduals (n=1)
Individuals (n=1)
40
40
6
60
8
80
1 0
10
0
0
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Votes
Votes
Small groups (n=3)
Small groups (n=3)
Large r s ( 10)
Large groups (n=10)
Cumulative distribution
Cumulative distribution
Av r ge
Average
20
20
4
40
6
60
8
80
1 0
10
0
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
Votes
Votes
Average
Average
Minimum
Minimum
axi u
Maximum
Cumulative distribution
Cumulative distribution
Sm ll groups (n=3)
Small groups (n=3)
50
50
6
60
7
70
8
80
9
90
1 0
10
0
0
0
2
2
4
4 6 8 10
Votes
Votes
Small groups (n=3)
Small groups (n=3)
Large r s ( 10)
Large groups (n=10)
Cumulative distribution
Cumulative distribution
Minimum
Minimum
20
20
4
40
6
60
8
80
1 0
10
0
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
Votes
Votes
Average
Average
Minimum
Minimum
axi u
Maximum
Cumulative distribution
Cumulative distribution
L rge groups (n=10)
Large groups (n=10)
20
20
4
40
6
60
8
80
1 0
10
0
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
Votes
Votes
Small groups (n=3)
Small groups (n=3)
Large r s ( 10)
Large groups (n=10)
Cumulative distribution
Cumulative distribution
Maximum
Maximum
[12] 
 
in MAX (2.91) is almost twice as large as the average reported type in MIN (1.49), and 
this difference is strongly significant (Wilcoxon test, p<0.0001). 
 
We pose the question as to whether the violation of the Equivalence Theorem was 
predicted by participants. The answer is a clear ‘Yes’. Average predictions are again 
ordered in the sequence MIN-AVG-MAX (0.88, 2.43 and 4.06, respectively), and all 
three pair-wise comparisons are statistically significant at the 1% level (Wilcoxon test, p-
value<.0001).19 
 
 
4. Experiment II: The joy of ruling 
Experiment I yields two somewhat contradictory results. The absence of a group size 
effect is consistent with a truthful revelation of types, in line with the dominant strategy 
described in section 2 for MAX and MIN. On the other hand, the mean vote is 
significantly higher in the MAX than in the MIN. We explore this contradiction in a 
second experiment, borrowing some ideas from the behavioural analysis of auctions and 
contests. 
 
In both MAX and MIN, the outcome is determined by a single player, e.g. by the winner 
of the auction-type mechanism. In the auction literature the so-called joy-of-winning has 
been used to explain overbidding in first price auctions (see for example, Cooper et al, 
2008). The joy-of-winning is defined as the extra utility that a player gets from winning 
the auction. A similar concept is used in contest theory to explain the overinvestment 
observed in the lab (see Dechenaux et al, 2012). In our setting we define the joy of ruling 
as the extra utility that a team member gets from their donation being selected by the 
mechanism and imposed on all the team members. Joy of ruling may take our participants 
away from the standard equilibrium behaviour. Proposition 1 formally states this intuition 
in a very simple way:  
 
Proposition 1. If a player enjoys a joy of ruling, then their vote in the MAX (MIN) 
mechanism will be larger (smaller) than their dominant strategy if they hold positive 
beliefs around the dominant strategy. 
Proof. See Appendix A 
 
We next describe Experiment II, conceived as a test of the joy of ruling hypothesis, as 
described in Proposition 1. 
 
4.1 Experimental design and procedures 
Relative to Experiment I, in the second experiment we specifically address three issues: 
we elicit player’s types using a standard dictator game (DG), their beliefs on the 
distribution of types, and the intensity of joy of ruling, auctioning the right to make one 
																																								 																				
19 The average success rate is 25.20%, with the highest score in the MIN mechanism (52.44%) and the 
lowest in the MAX mechanism (8.54%). 
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decision for a very large group. Experiment II is divided into two blocks and participants 
were aware of this fact from the very beginning of the experiment. They received detailed 
instructions about the decisions in each block only at the beginning of each one. Table 3 
provides a summary of the design. 
 
Table 3. Experimental Design - Experiment II 
First block 
(Six decisions) 
Second block 
(Two predictions) 
Stage 1: Types  
Q1: Percentage of zero donations in D1 
Q2: Average positive donation in D1 
D1: Standard Dictator Game (DG) 
 
Stage 2: Voting 
D2, D3 and D4: Three donation mechanisms 
(i)   AVG  → MIN  → MAX 
(ii)  MAX → AVG  → MIN 
(iii) MIN  → MAX → AVG 
 
Stage 3: Joy of ruling 
D5: Choosing a common donation (SD) 
D6: Bidding for imposing a common decision (Bid) 
 
Participants faced 8 different tasks in total: six decisions in block 1 and two predictions 
in block 2. They first participated in a standard Dictator game (decision D1, DG), and we 
used this decision to learn about their individual type. Participants then made three 
consecutive decisions (D2, D3 and D4), closely replicating Experiment I, and were 
randomly assigned to one of three different sequences (AVG-MIN-MAX, MAX-AVG-
MIN, MIN-MAX-AVG). Given the results of Experiment I, we kept the group size 
constant and assigned all participants to groups of 3 members.  
 
Anticipating the violation of the Equivalence Theorem, participants were asked to select 
a donation level for all participants (including themselves) in the session (decision D5; 
one decision would be selected at random and implemented). As Experiment II consisted 
of one session with 45 subjects, the group size is much larger than those used in 
Experiment I (3 and 10). The comparison of D1 and D5 in Experiment II is a strong test 
of any group size effect.  
 
In the last decision (D6, BID), individuals participated in a second price auction. They 
could bid to impose their D5 decision (super dictators, SD) on all other participants. The 
highest bidder earned their endowment minus the second largest bid, and other 
participants earned the endowment minus the donation chosen by the highest bidder in 
D5. As truthful revelation is expected –note that it is a second price auction-, D6 measures 
the intensity of the joy of ruling when participants may impose their decision on a large 
group. 
 
Finally, and consistent with the Bayesian environment in which the experiment is framed, 
subjects made incentivized predictions about other participants’ types (e.g. about their D1 
choices). For the sake of simplicity, the predictive exercise consisted of two parts: (i) the 
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percentage of zero donations, and (ii) the average of all positive donations. Since 
gathering individual beliefs about the distribution of types in the population was too 
ambitious, we opted to elicit two main fields: the fraction of selfish players in the 
population (Q1) and the average type of non-selfish players (Q2). We can compute the 
expected donation level 𝑄 = 1 − 𝑄1 ×𝑄2 from them. 
 
As in Experiment I, subjects did not receive any information feedback until the very end 
of the experiment, so decisions are independent. Subjects were paid for one randomly 
selected decision from the first block and for the accuracy of their predictions using a 
simple and linear scoring rule. 20 
 
The double blind procedures were identical to those used in Experiment I. The 
computerized experiment was conducted in the same laboratory, LINEEX, in 2013, using 
the same z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in only one session. It lasted slightly less 
than 60 minutes and the average payoff was €13.88. All 45 participants were 
undergraduate students, most of them from Business and Economics degrees at the 
University of Valencia, with no prior experience in similar experiments. Instructions were 
read aloud before the experiment started, and subjects completed a quiz to maximize the 
understanding of the instructions. As in Experiment I, donations were made to the same 
reputable public Spanish charity.   
  
4.2 Experimental results 
Table 4 displays the aggregate results for the six decisions made in the first block. The 
average donation in the Standard Dictator Game (D1) is 37.8% of the endowment, much 
larger than the mean donation in Experiment I but more in accordance with the charity 
effect observed by Eckel and Grossman (1996), whose percentage of donations went up 
to 30%.21 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics from Block I in Experiment II 
 Stage 
Type 
D1 
Voting 
D2-D3-D4 
Joy of Ruling 
D5-D6 
DG MIN AVG MAX SD BID 
Group size 1 3 3 3 45 45 
Average 3.78 2.95 3.02 3.55 3.26 4.53 
(2.59) (2.23) (2.34) (2.64) (1.89) (2.59) 
# observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 
(Std. Dev. in brackets) 
 
																																								 																				
20 A correct prediction was rewarded with €2.50, and one euro was deducted for every ten percentage 
points/€1 difference in Q1 and Q2, respectively. 
21 We do not have a good rationale for this difference. Note that the two experiments have very different 
structures and subjects made the same decision in very different framings. While participants in the 
individual condition of Experiment I obtained their earnings almost exclusively from their individual 
decisions, participants in Experiment II knew their first decision would be used to compute their final 
earnings with only a relatively small probability. 
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We first investigate the Equivalence Theorem and the existence of any group size effect. 
As in Experiment I, standard Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests at the individual level reveal 
that the mean vote is significantly larger in the MAX mechanism (3.55) than in the MIN 
mechanism (2.95) (p=0.0396), although the difference between the mean votes in the 
MIN and the AVG mechanisms is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-ranked 
test, p=0.2191). Votes increase in the sequence of mechanisms MIN-AVG-MAX, as in 
Experiment I, and we summarize this in Result 3: 
 
Result 3. As in Experiment I, the Equivalence Theorem is violated in Experiment II. 
 
In the super-dictator decision SD (D5), subjects had to select a donation for all 
participants in the experiment. As the average decision (3.26) is not statistically different 
from D1 (the standard dictator game, Wilcoxon test, p=0.2045) we conclude that even 
with a very large group of 45 individuals there is no group size effect: 
 
Result 4. As in Experiment I, there is no group size effect in Experiment II. 
 
Figure 2 below displays the cumulative distribution of votes in Experiment II and 
confirms Results 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative distribution of votes in Experiment II 
Across Mechanisms Dictator vs Super dictator 
  
 
Results 3 and 4 replicate the main findings in Experiment I. Our within subject design is 
useful to compare individual decisions. Table 5 compares votes in the MAX and MIN 
mechanisms in both experiments, and classifies them in three groups following the 
Equivalence Theorem. 
 
Table 5. An analysis of the Equivalence Theorem at the Individual Level 
Experiment Group size # MAX>MIN MAX=MIN MAX<MIN 
I 
10 40 18  (45.0%) 
21  
(52.5%) 
1  
(2.5%) 
3 42 17  (40.5%) 
19  
(45.2%) 
6  
(14.3%) 
II 3 45 18  (40.0%) 
19  
(42.2%) 
8  
(17.8%) 
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(Percentages over the number of observations in brackets) 
 
For small groups of 3 participants, 45.2% of subjects cast identical votes in both 
mechanisms in Experiment I, and 42.2% in Experiment II. Results are remarkably similar. 
In both experiments, substantially more participants cast a larger vote in the MAX than 
in the MIN mechanism: 40.5% versus 14.3% in Experiment I, and 40% versus 17.8% in 
Experiment II, again supporting the violation of the Equivalence Theorem. 
 
Result 5. The Equivalence Theorem does not hold for more than half of the subjects in 
Experiments I and II 
 
Decision 6 captures the intensity of the joy of ruling, as it measures how much participants 
are willing to pay to impose their dictatorial decision (D5) on all other participants in the 
session (rule over them). If the joy of ruling experienced by subjects is linked to the 
violation of the Equivalence Theorem, bids in D6 should be positively associated with 
this violation. We define a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the experimental 
subjects make the same choice in the MAX and MIN (complying with the Equivalence 
Theorem) otherwise the value is 0. As independent variables, we use the player’s type 
(D1), and their joy of ruling intensity (D6). Table 6 displays the marginal effects for the 
covariates, computed at the means. 
 
Table 6. Probability of compliance with the Equivalence Theorem  
Variable Marginal Effect 
Type (D1) 0.0325 
(0.0350) 
Joy of ruling (D6) -0.0922*** 
(0.0338) 
Log likelihood 
Number of observations 
-26.667 
45 
(Std Dev. in parenthesis) *** 1% level, marginal effects after probit regressions 
 
The estimates are in line with our prediction. The probability of compliance does not 
depend on the player’s type. In other words, selfishness does not imply a higher 
probability of violating the Equivalence Theorem. Joy of ruling has a highly significant 
and negative marginal effect; individuals bidding high to impose their decision on others 
comply significantly less with the Equivalence Theorem. The magnitude of the effect is 
substantial, as for each additional Euro a participant bids, the probability of violating the 
Equivalence Theorem increases by nearly 10%.  
 
We now investigate voting behaviour in the MIN and MAX mechanisms. The Bayesian 
model predicts that voting positively depends on types, the beliefs about others’ votes, 
and joy of ruling (e.g. in the MIN condition, higher expected minimums and stronger joy 
of ruling increase the incentives to vote low). Given that in a Bayesian framework a 
player’s belief is typically assumed to depend on their type, we estimate a structural model 
with two equations: one for voting behaviour as explained above, and the other for beliefs. 
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Table 7 contains the estimation of this structural model using maximum likelihood, 
controlling for the order in which the mechanisms were played and some demographics.22  
 
As eliciting the probability distribution of the minimum (maximum) vote in the MIN 
(MAX) mechanism was procedurally demanding and complex, we use Q1 (Q2) as a proxy 
of the relevant beliefs in the MIN (MAX) mechanism. A higher proportion of selfish 
players (Q1) is naturally associated with a higher probability of facing a low minimum 
vote in your group. Similarly, a higher expected donation of non-selfish players comes 
associated with a large probability of getting a high vote in your group. In the AVG 
mechanism we use Q the expected donation in the Dictator Game.23 
 
Table 7. Individual determinants of voting behaviour in Experiment II 
Maximum likelihood Mechanism 
Structural MIN AVG MAX 
Dep Variable: Vote    
Type (D1) 0.4049** 0.3069** 0.2794* 
 (0.159) (0.120) (0.162) 
Beliefs (Q1/Q/Q2) 0.0018 0.3899** 0.5903* 
 (0.013) (0.159) (0.315) 
Joy of ruling (D6) 0.1600 0.2839*** 0.2560** 
 (0.118) (0.081) (0.109) 
Dep Variable: Beliefs    
Type (D1) -4.8470*** 0.3958*** 0.3293*** 
 (1.641) (0.111) (0.095) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45 45 45 
Log pseudo likelihood -724.397 -588.990 -595.929 
Coefficient of determination 0.636 0.730 0.656 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We first analyse the belief equation. Type is strongly significant in all mechanisms: the 
more altruistic a player is, the more altruistic they believe others are. The sign in the MIN 
mechanism is negative because beliefs refer to the expected proportion of selfish players 
(while they refer to non-selfish behaviour in the other two cases).  
 
We now focus on the voting equation. While in all three mechanisms, type is again 
positive and significant, as predicted by the Bayesian model, only in MAX and AVG joy 
of ruling (D6) and beliefs play a positive and significant effect on voting. The vast 
violation of the Equivalence Theorem is consistent with the presence of joy of ruling in 
																																								 																				
22 Control variables are Order, Female, Age, Economics and Trust (see the coefficients of these control 
variables in Table 1A in the appendix). 
23 The econometric results in Table 7 are robust to different specifications. If we use the expected donation 
Q the results hold with very minor changes (Type (D1) for the MAX mechanism is less marginally 
significant). As adding a quadratic term of Type does not improve the models’ goodness of fit (and the 
quadratic term is insignificant in all cases but the MAX mechanism), we report the simpler model in Table 
7, and include it in the analysis of the super dictatorial decision D5 in Table 8 (see the discussion below). 
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the MAX mechanism. We summarize these findings in our Result 6: 
 
Result 6. We find evidence of joy of ruling in the AVG and MAX mechanisms, but not in 
the MIN mechanism.  
 
We do not have a good explanation as to why voting behaviour in the MIN does not 
depend on the joy of ruling. Imposing decisions may be less appealing when “allocating 
peanuts” or when it reveals mean decisions to others. Interestingly, the joy of ruling plays 
a significant role in the AVG mechanism, when there is no capacity to rule on the 
decisions of others, consistently with preference conformism (e.g. behaving as the others 
do; Fatas et al 2017 documents well this phenomenon).  
 
We finally investigate the determinants of the super dictatorial decision (D5), and the joy 
of ruling (D6). Following the Bayesian framework, we estimate a structural model with 
the super dictatorial decision, the joy of ruling and the belief equations. Table 8 contains 
the maximum likelihood estimation of this model (with the same controls as those used 
in Table 7). 
 
Table 8. Individual determinants of behaviour in Experiment II 
Maximum likelihood  
Structural  
Dep Variable: Super dictatorial decision (D5)  
Type (D1) 0.6012*** 
 (0.211) 
Type Squared (D12) -0.0458** 
 (0.022) 
Beliefs (Q) 0.4659* 
 (0.262) 
Joy of ruling (D6) 0.1439 
 (0.248) 
Dep Variable: Beliefs   
Type (D1) 0.3958*** 
 (0.111) 
Dep Variable: Joy of ruling (D6)  
Type (D1) -0.090 
 (0.276) 
Beliefs (Q) 0.9690 
 (0.796) 
Super dictatorial decision (D5) -0.0170 
 (1.060) 
Controls Yes 
Observations 45 
Log pseudo likelihood -726.6803 
Coefficient of Determination 0.719 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Consistent with our model, the super dictatorial decision (D5) depends positively on 
subjects’ types (D1), but not on their joy of ruling (D6), as its coefficient is not 
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significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with the idea that their decision 
as super dictators (D5) does not depend on how much participants are willing to pay to 
impose that decision on others (D6). Their super dictatorial decision does positively 
depend on their beliefs: the less selfish they believe other participants are, the larger the 
imposed contribution; choosing differently when deciding for the whole group, possibly 
because they feel responsible for others (as in Cason and Mui, 1997, Masclet et al, 2009 
and Charness and Jackson, 2009).  
 
As suggested by the negative and significant coefficient of the quadratic type variable, 
the super dictatorial decision does not depend linearly on the subject’s own type. Figure 
3 displays the estimated adjustment when imposing a contribution level on others (defined 
as the difference between the own type, decision D1, and the estimated super dictatorial 
decision from the super dictatorial equation).24 More altruistic subjects (those with large 
donations in D1) act as benevolent dictators and downwardly adjust their super-dictatorial 
decision. 
 
Figure 3. Estimated adjustment in the super dictatorial decision (D5) 
  
 
The last estimate shown at the bottom of Table 8 strongly suggests that the intensity of 
joy of ruling is not driven by participants’ types, beliefs or super-dictatorial decisions. 
We summarise this analysis in our last result: 
 
																																								 																				
24 Figure 3 is a standard whisker and box graph. The box contains the 25%-75% quartiles, the bar 
corresponds to the median, and whiskers include the adjacent values in each condition. 
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Result 7. Super-dictatorial decisions depend on participants’ beliefs, consistent with a 
sense of responsibility when deciding for others. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Donation decisions are many times made by groups. In this paper, we model collective 
giving mechanisms that aggregate individual preferences for donations into a social 
preference for the public good. Players reveal how much they wish to donate (individual 
votes), and the mechanism imposes a common donation level to all members (a collective 
giving). 
 
We investigate the performance of three mechanisms: AVG, MAX and MIN, in which 
the imposed donation on all members is the average, the largest, and the smallest vote, 
respectively. Standard theories of both pure and impure altruism predict the same votes 
in the MAX and the MIN mechanisms, because both mechanisms share the same 
dominant voting strategy. We find however that this prediction is violated in the lab: 
subjects cast larger votes in the MAX than in the MIN mechanism (with votes in the AVG 
mechanisms being in between). 
 
We propose an explanation based on the concept of joy of ruling, defined as the extra 
utility that a player gets from winning the contest to rule and impose their donation on the 
remaining members. A similar concept of joy of winning has been well documented in 
the auction (Cooper and Fang, 2008) and conflict (Sheremeta et al, 2012) literature to 
account for deviations from equilibrium predictions. A joy of ruling makes players in the 
MIN (MAX) mechanism cast a vote below (above) the dominant one because it increases 
their chances of winning the right to rule. This “extra” vote implies a break of the 
equivalence theorem. 
 
When subjects compete for the right to impose a “super dictatorial” donating decision 
over a large group of other participants, their bids are positively and significantly 
correlated with their chances of violating the equivalence theorem. Votes in the MAX 
and AVG mechanisms (but not in the MIN) increase with the bid, suggesting that the joy 
of ruling drives behaviour in the MAX but not the MIN mechanism. Besides the joy of 
ruling, we also find traces of responsibility in subjects’ behaviour regarding the super 
dictatorial decision. The common donation imposed over the large group depends on their 
beliefs about the altruism of others and their own type: more altruistic oriented subjects 
tend to act as benevolent dictators, and selfish oriented individuals do not adjust their 
decisions. 
 
Even when we admit the risks of automatically extrapolating our results to real-world 
situations, the existence of a joy of ruling and a sense of responsibility calls for some 
caution when designing collective giving institutions. The different, sometimes 
conflicting, behavioural effects we document may be sensitive to the exogenously 
imposed aggregation mechanism, particularly when participants cannot opt-out of the 
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collective donation. Endogenously determined mechanisms allowing subjects to self-
select their preferred donation rule could substantially change both votes and the resulting 
common donation, mitigating some of the effects observed in this paper. We leave the 
analysis of alternative mechanisms for future research.  
 
Since our results are consistent with previous findings in the behavioural analysis of 
auctions and contest, our results may illustrate a common phenomenon in collective 
giving. The joy of ruling we observe is consistent with individuals intrinsically valuing 
the right to make a particular decision: the right to impose their preferred donation on the 
rest of the group. As in Fehr et al (2013), Bartling et al (2014) and Owens et al (2014), 
our participants prefer to rule over others, and avoid their being controlled.  
 
  
[22] 
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APPENDIX A. Proofs 
Proof of Theorem 1. 
(a) MAX Mechanism. Focus on the best response function of individual i to any profile 
of reported types 𝜃C$. By substituting the restrictions of the maximization problem in the 
utility function, the best response function is obtained from the solution of the following 
maximization problem 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 L5 𝑈$ 𝑤 −𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃$, 𝜃C$ , 𝑛	 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃$, 𝜃C$  
 
Step a.1. Consider first the profile 𝜃C$ = 0,⋯ ,0 . In this case, 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃C$ = 0 and 
therefore player i’s best response solves 𝑚𝑎𝑥 L5 𝑈$ 𝑤 − 𝜃$, 𝑛𝜃$ . Given that the utility 
function is strictly quasi-concave, this maximisation problem has a unique solution 𝑔$01. 
Step a.2. Focus now on those vote profiles 𝜃C$ for which 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃C$ ≤ 𝑔$01. In this case, 
player i will report 𝑔$01. Hence, 𝑔$01 is best response to those strategy profiles with 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃C$ ≤ 𝑔$01. 
Step a.3. We finally consider those vote profiles such that 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃C$ > 𝑔$01. In this case, 
the strict quasi-concavity assures that all reported types larger than 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃C$  yield a 
strictly lower utility level than that associated with voting 𝑔$01. This completes the proof. 
qed 
 
(b) MIN Mechanism. The proof follows the same lines as those of Proposition 1. The best 
response function comes from the solution of the following maximization problem 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 L5 𝑈$ 𝑤 −𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜃$, 𝜃C$ , 𝑛	𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜃$, 𝜃C$  
 
For all profiles such that 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜃$, 𝜃C$ = 𝜃$, player i will solve the problem 𝑚𝑎𝑥 L5 𝑈$ 𝑤 − 𝜃$, 𝑛𝜃$  whose solution is 𝑔$01. For all profiles such that 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜃C$ <𝑔$01, player i is indifferent between reporting 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜃C$  or reporting 𝑔$01. This completes 
the proof. qed 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. Firstly, we consider the MAX Institution. Let b denote the benefit 
from setting the group contribution level. Let 𝐹$ 𝑀 𝜃$  be player i’s belief about the 
highest message M sent by the other players given his own type.  Then, player i’s problem 
is 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 L5 𝑢$ 𝑤 − 𝜃$, 𝑛𝜃$ + 𝑏 𝑑𝐹$ 𝑀 𝜃$L5\ ]^_`ab	$′c	dacc_4a	$c	ca^aefag	h`	fia	daei_)$cd
+ 𝑢$ 𝑤 −𝑀, 𝑛𝑀 𝑑𝐹$ 𝑀 𝜃$KL5]^_`ab	$′c	dacc_4a	$c	)jf	ca^aefag	h`	fia	daei_)$cd
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The first order condition is 
 k l5 KCL5,)L5 Mh gm5 𝑀 𝜃$ M l5 KCn,)n gm5 𝑀 𝜃$op5p5q kL5 + 𝑏 k gm5 𝑀 𝜃$p5q kL5 = 0  
 
We can actually prove that the equilibrium message will not be the super dictatorial 
decision 𝑔$01. In order to prove it, we evaluate this first order condition at the dominant 
strategy 𝑔$01. By definition, the first term on the left-hand side is zero, because 𝑔$01 is the 
optimal behaviour in the absence of joy of ruling. This implies that the value of the first 
order condition evaluated at 𝑔$01 is 𝑏𝑓$ 𝑔$01 𝜃$ , which is different from zero, where 𝑓$ 𝑔$01 𝜃$  is the derivative of 𝐹 𝑔$01 𝜃$ . This means that if 𝑏 > (<)0, then player i 
improves by sending a message larger (smaller) than 𝑔$01.  
 
The analysis of the MIN Institution is analogous. qed 
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APPENDIX 
[Not to be included in the main text; included as an appendix at the end of the manuscript, or online] 
 
Table 1A:  Behavioural determinants of type, including controls, Experiment II 
Maximum likelihood (1) (2) (3) 
Structural MIN AVG MAX 
Dep Variable: Vote    
Type 0.4049*** 0.3069** 0.2794* 
 (0.158) (0.120) (0.162) 
Beliefs 0.0018 0.3899** 0.5903* 
 (0.0172) (0.159) (0.315) 
Joy of ruling 0.1600 0.2839*** 0.2560** 
 (0.102) (0.081) (0.109) 
Order -0.1617 -0.0969 -0.0831 
 (0.250) (0.259) (0.276) 
Age 0.0121 0.2201 0.1759** 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.078) 
Female 1.5596*** 1.7505*** 1.3810** 
 (0.420) (0.466) (0.570) 
Economics 1.5777 -0.3378 2.3262* 
 (1.220) (0.510) (1.256) 
Trust 0.6683 -0.4767 0.2822 
 (0.794) (0.500) (0.777) 
Constant -0.5896 -1.721 -5.7363* 
 (2.076) (1.711) (2.139) 
Dep Variable: Beliefs    
Type -4.8470*** 0.3958*** 0.3293*** 
 (1.641) (0.111) (0.064) 
Order 0.6299 -0.1414 -0.1612 
 (3.643) (0.192) (0.179) 
Age -0.0080 -0.0157 -0.0268 
 (1.055) (0.055) (0.042) 
Female -3.8950 -0.0817 -0.1729 
 (6.739) (0.376) (0.334) 
Economics 10.6549 -0.4626 -0.4110 
 (13.479) (0.697) (0.525) 
Trust -11.6817 0.7465 0.5379 
 (7.375) (0.456) (0.380) 
Constant 50.9440* 1.7428 3.1884 
 (27.172) (1.342) (1.040) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45 45 45 
Log likelihood -724.397 -588.990 -595.929 
CD 0.636 0.730 0.656 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2A: Individual determinants of dictatorial behaviour and joy of ruling in 
Experiment II 
 
Maximum likelihood  
Structural (1) 
Dep Variable: Super dictatorial decision  
Type 0.6012*** 
 (0.211) 
Type Squared -0.0458** 
 (0.022) 
Beliefs 0.4659* 
 (0.262) 
Joy of ruling 0.1439 
 (0.248) 
Order -0.2501 
 (0.258) 
Age 0.0109 
 (0.040) 
Female 1.0711* 
 (0.390) 
Economics -0.1013 
 (0.399) 
Trust -0.9312** 
 (0.315) 
Constant -0.1524 
 (1.298) 
Dep Variable: Beliefs  
Type 0.3958*** 
 (0.111) 
Order -0.1414 
 (0.192) 
Age -0.0157 
 (0.055) 
Female -0.0817 
 (0.376) 
Economics -0.4626 
 (0.697) 
Trust 0.7465 
 (0.456) 
Constant 1.7428 
 (1.342) 
Dep Variable: Joy of ruling  
Type -0.090 
 (0.276) 
Beliefs 0.9690 
 (0.796) 
Super dictatorial decision -0.0170 
 (1.060) 
[29] 
 
Order -0.6999 
 ((0.494) 
Age 0.0410 
 (0.105) 
Female -0.0608 
 (1.361) 
Economics 0.9540 
 (1.022) 
Trust -0.1112 
 (1.670) 
Constant 2.7843 
 (2.314) 
Controls Yes 
Observations 45 
Log pseudo likelihood -726.6803 
Coefficient of Determination 0.719 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The variable Trust is a binary variable defined using the answer to the following question: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot 
be careful in dealing with people”? 
